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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOHN M. ALEXANDER and
HELEN ALEXANDER,

PlaintiffsRespondents,
vs.

Case No. 17,339

LEE DELL BROWN, GLEN F.
BROWN, WAYNE L. BROWN

and WARREN D. BROWN,
partners, d/b/a BLW
COMPANY,
DefendantsAppellants.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for breach of contract.

The plaintiffs

sought damages for the defendants' alleged failure to comply
with the terms of an earnest money agreement for the sale of
real estate.

In particular, plaintiffs alleged that defendants

failed to provide street paving, sidewalk and curb and gutter
as required by the earnest money agreement.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried on June 19, 1980, before the Honorable
Allen B. Sorensen, District Judge, in the District Court of
the Fourth Judicial District in and for Utah County.
The Court awarded judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in
the amount of $4,500.00, plus attorney's fees of $960.00 and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and costs of $27.50.

(See Appendix "A" for a copy of th,

ings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment.)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs-Respondents seek to have the judgment oft:,
trial court affirmed.
Plaintiffs-Respondents also request that the award fo:
attorney's fees be increased by an amount sufficient to
the costs of responding to this appeal if the judgment is
affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Alexander, had been loot:
for an appropriate subdivision lot upon which they intende;
to build a home.

They saw defendants' newspaper advertis':'

(plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1) which listed for sale "fully i··
proved-lots."

(R. 126)

The plaintiffs negotiated with Boi

Sorensen, a salesman and agent for the defendants, to arw
to purchase a lot in the subdivision.

Mr. Sorensen offerei

the plaintiffs several lots to choose from.

(R. 127) The1

chose lot #5 because it fit their house plans better thani"I
of the other lots.

Plaintiffs• house plans had a garage UI

opened to the side of the house r·a ther than to the front,'
a finished side road was essential in order to afford con·
venient entrance and access to the garage.

( R. 1 28)

The

plot plan showed a main road running in front (east) of
#5, and a side street on the north side of the lot (see
plaintiffs' Exhibit No.

3).
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lJ'.

I

On November 26, 1973, plaintiffs executed an earnest
~oney

receipt and offer to purchase contract (a copy of which

is attached as Appendix "B") with the defendants.

Lines 29

Jnd 30 of that agreement contained the sentence "The following
special improvements are included in this sale;" and listed
several possible improvements that could be marked with "x"
to indicate "yes" or "o" to indicate "no."

An "x" had been

placed in the boxes next to the words "sidewalk," "curb and
gutter," and "special street paving," among others.

Line 31

oontained room to list any exceptions; the words "no exceptions"
had been entered instead (see plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 2 and
Appendix "B" attached).

The agreement was prepared by the

defendants' agent and representative, Boyd Sorensen.
The defendants did improve the main road (1920 West) as
required, but at no time- have the defendants made any attempt
to provide any of the improvements to the side road (460 South)
(R, 129-130).
The north half of the side street was paved by the owner
of lot 16, Edwin Darrell Jenkins, because the defendants had
not contracted to provide a fully improved lot complete with
street paving, sidewalks, and curb and gutter in their contract
with Mr. Jenkins.

(R. 138, 157-158)

Mr. Jenkins also testi-

fied that the defendants' agent Sorensen had told him that the
defendants intended to provide the improvements to the plaintiffs'
lot by putting in the street paving, curb, gutter and sidewalk on
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the Alexander's side of 460 South (R. 157-158).
As a result of the side street ( 460 South) no t beir,~
·

on the south side, the plaintiffs have been unable to co;:
the landscaping of their lot.

(R.

134)

border between the lot and the street.

There is no deL:.
During the winter

spring months, the mud was so bad that plaintiffs were
to even get into their garage.

ur.o

To mitigate this problemt

plaintiffs constructed a driveway at a right angle to the1
garage and across the lot to 1920 West street.

The drive1

is serviceable, but access to the two-car garage is incom·
at best.

(R.

134-135)

The cost to the plaintiffs of cons

the additional driveway was about $192.00, not includingt
cost of plaintiffs' own labor (about one day was spent),
136)

The plaintiffs believed that the city would enforce i
requirement that all roads in the subdivision be improved.
(R. 141,

145)

The city engineer for the City of Provo testified tha
the City required that all roads in the subdivision, as

~

51'!
including curb, gutter, '

on the plot plan, be improved,
walks and paving.

5

(R. 147-149)

of instaJlin
There was evidence that th e Current Cost
lineal foot
the required improvements would be $10.00 per
he plaintiffs' s
install the sidewalk, curb an d gut t er On t
f 00 t to i
of 460 South and an additional $10.00 per lineal
stall asphalt street paving.

(R. 150-151)

The lengt
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h ,f
u•

I

'

l

plaintiffs' lot along the unfinished road (460 South) is 99
feet.

(R. 131)

There was also testimony that in early 1974

ilie improvements would have cost approximately $7.00 per lineal
foot for the sidewalk, curb and gutter and $7.00 per lineal
foot for the asphalt.
~nkins,

(R. 151-152)

The cost in 1976 to Mr.

the owner of lot 16, to put in the sidewalk, curb,

gutter and street paving was $4, 500. 00.

(R. 161-162)

On the question of attorney's fees, plaintiffs' counsel
~stified

that he had billed the plaintiffs for $962.50 in

attorney's fees including $27.50 in costs prior to the day of
the trial.

(R. 163)

He further testified that he estimated

an additional $400. 00 in attorney's fees would be incurred for
ilie trial itself and the preparation of any additional pleadings if plaintiffs prevailed.

(R. 164)

Defendants' counsel testified that $750.00 would be a
reasonable attorney's fee.

(R. 166)

The Court, after finding

in plaintiffs' favor, reached a compromise award of $960.00
in attorney's fees and $27.50 in costs.

(See R. 106 and

Appendix "A" attached.)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
THE CONTRACT WAS UNAMBIGUOUS, AND THAT
PAROL EVIDENCE WAS THEREFORE INADMISSIBLE
TO MODIFY THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT •
It is well established that the meaning of a contract is
determined by the intent of the parties to the contract, of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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_c;_

which the con tract itself is the primary evidence.
Court stated in Continental Bank and Trust Comnany
rc-

As ti:.
VS,

Byt

i

I

6 Utah 2d '38, 306 P.2d 773, 775 (1957), "[t]his intent snr'

be ascertained first from the four corners of the instru~e·;
itself, second from other contemporaneous writings concerri:;
the same subject matter, and third from the extrinsic par)
evidence of the intentions.

I

If the ambiguity can be recotl

from a reasonable interpretation of the instrument, extrir.:.,.
evidence should not be allowed."

(Ci tat ions omitted)

1

t\
!

This parol evidence rule was reaffirmed by the Utah

Court in E. A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. vs. Brod':
522 P.2d 144, 145-146 (Utah, 1974), where this Court state'
that:
• • • parole [sic] evidence may not be given
to change the terms of a written agreement
which are clear, definite, and unambiguous.
To permit that would be to cast doubt upon
the integrity of all contracts and to leave
a party to a solemn agreement at the mercy
of the uncertainties of oral testimony
given by one who is in the subsequent li~t
of events discovers that he made a bad bargain.
(Footnote omitted)
As stated by the Colorado Supreme Court:
The mere fact that there is a difference
between the parties as to the interpretation of an instrument does not of itself
create an ambiguity.
Burns vs. Burns, 454 P.2d 814, 818 (Colo. 1969).
The question is not, therefore, whether the
be construed to have two different meanings, but

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6-

contract r.
rather

•:'I
!

that is

~

reasonable interpretation of the instruments • •

continental Bank, supra.

(Emphasis added)

It is also well established that contract provisions are
construed against the party who drafted the agreement,

See,

e.g., Seal vs. Tayco, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 323, 400 P.2d 503 (1965),

and Continental Bank, supra, 306 P.2d at 775.
If there is uncertainty as to which of two possible interpretations is correct, the contract will be construed against
the drafter.
In the case at bar, the defendants provided their own
printed earnest money receipt and offer to purchase form.
One clause, as filled out by the defendants' agent Sorensen,
stated:
The following special improvements are
included in this sale, • • • sidewalk,
curb and gutter, special street paving
A reasonable interpretation of this contract provision
is that all streets bordering the lot would be paved and have
curbs, gutters and sidewalks.

The word "special" is used

twice, indicating that the street paving and other improvements would be different than "ordinary" improvements; it would
~ reasonable to infer that the word "special" indicated that

the paving would be more than ordinary.

In addition, the

defendants had an opportunity to list any exceptions or explana-

".I.

I

I

tions relevant to the listed improvements, but chose to write
"no exceptions" instead.

(See plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 2 -

f\Ppenclix "B" attached.)

1
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A reasonable interpretation of this contract pro · .
•

is that all streets bordering the lot would be oavea
.

•

VlStn·

,..

• 1n,

trial court so interpreted the contract, and its interpret•·
tion should be affirmed.
That the contract term "special street paving" meant

1

paving of all streets in the subdivision is further eviden:
by examining "other writings concerning the same subject

matter," as was advocated by this Court in Continental Ban•,
supra.
The writings that were in existence at the time of U:
contract was signed, and which would thus be relevant

in~

eating what is the proper meaning of the contract, incluae
the advertisement for the lot which the defendants placed•
the newspaper (plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1) and the plot plar.
of the subdivision which had been recorded at the Utah Cour:
Recorder's Office (plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 3).
In the newspaper advertisement, the defendants descril:
the lot as "fully improved."

This is further evidence that

the "special street paving" listed in the contract with the
other "special improvements" as being provided by the defe::
extended to all streets adjoining the lot.

If only part o:

the streets were finished, how could the lot be considered
"fully improved?"
The recorded plot plan of the subdivision showed botr,
main and side streets, and thus would indicate that when
contract included "special street paving" as one of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"special improvements," both the main and side streets would
be paved.
In addition, the Provo City subdivision regulations also
required that the developer install paving, curbs, gutters and
sidewalks on all streets in the subdivision.

(R. 148-149)

The defendants rely on the Wyoming case of Kilbourne Park
Corp. vs. Buckingham, 404 P.2d 244, 245 (Wyo. 1965) as showing
that a contract, requiring simply that the contractor complete
all roadways as platted in a certain subdivi·sion, was ambiguous.

A careful reading of the case supports the trial court's conclusion in the case at bar that the contract was unambiguous
and that parol evidence was inadmissible.

The Wyoming court

stated (in a sentence only the last part of which is quoted
in defendants' brief) that:
Inasmuch as no plat of the Ponderosa Subdivision was attached and no such plat
was recorded at the time of the agreement,
it is immediately apparent that parol
evidence was required to establish what
subdivision plat delineated the roads then
being contracted to be built and what was
the full understanding of the parties as
to which roads were being contracted for.
In the case at bar the subdivision plat was recorded before
the time the contract was signed, and it was specifically
referred to in the contract; the exclusion of parol evidence
was, there fore, proper.
The trial court properly held that the contract was un1
1

~biguous, and that the term "special street paving" meant

that all streets would be paved.

The correctness of the
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court's conclusion is further evidenced by reference too:
writings concerning the same subJect matter.

Th

e trial cc

properly excluded parol evidence offered by the defendant,
seeking to vary the terms of the contract, and its decisi;·
should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE CONTRACT WAS AN INTEGRATION OF THE
COMPLETE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES,
AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED
PAROL EVIDENCE AIMED AT ALTERING THE
AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES.

II

Defendants' contention that the contract was not an 1)
gration can be answered by simply stating in full this Co~:
quotation from Wigmore on Evidence §2430, as found in Farr
Wasatch Chemical Co., 104 Utah 272, 143 P.2d 281, 283 (191
The inquiry is whether the writing was intended to cover a certain subject of
negotiations; for if it was not, then the
writing does not embody the transaction
on that subject * * *.
Whether a particular
subject of negotiation is embodied by the
writing depends wholly upon the intent of
the parties thereto * * *. This intent must
be sought* * *in the conduct and language of
the parties and the surrounding circumstances
* * *.
The question being whether certain
subjects of negotiation were intended to~
covered, we must compare the writing and the
negotiations before we can determine whether
they were in fact covered.* * *In deciding
upon this intent, the chief and most satisfactory index for the judge is found ~n t~
circumstances whether or not the part1cul~r
element of the alleged extrinsic negotiat~~
is dealt with at all in the writing. rf ~
is mentioned, covered, or dealt with in t~
writing, then presumably the writing w~~
meant to represent all of the transacti~ I
that element; if it is not, then probably

I
I
I

I
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the writing was not intended to embody that
element of the negotiation.
(Emphasis added)
Street paving was specifically mentioned in the contract,
and, therefore, "presumably the writing was meant to represent
all of the transaction on that element.

"

POINT III
PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO MITIGATE
THEIR DAMAGES BY PAVING THE STREET AT
THEIR OWN EXPENSE.
It is well established that the party damaged by a breach
of contract has a responsibility to act so as to not increase
the damages he incurs.

However, mitigation of damages does

not require that the damaged party completely assume the duty
of the breaching party to fulfill the contract.
Where the party whose duty it is primarily
to perform a contract has equal opportunity
for performance and equal knowledge of the
consequences of non-performance, he cannot,
while the contract is subsisting and in
force, be heard to say that plaintiff
might have performed for him.
So one who
has a right to insist on performance of a
contract according to its terms cannot be
required to mitigate the damages which the
other party will, by reason of a change in
the circumstances without his fault, sustain through performance.
25 C.J.S. Damages §34.
The plaintiffs in the instant case were no better able
than were the defendants to complete the paving as required
by the contract.

It would not be reasonable to expect the

Plaintiff homeowner to himsel~ arrange to have a road in the
subdivision paved when the subdivider had promised in the
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contract of sale that the street paving would be provid?i
the subdivider.
As stated in 25 C.J.S. Damages §33:
The efforts which the injured party must
make to avoid the consequences of the
wrongful act or omission need only be
reasonable under the circumstances of the
particular case, his duty being limited
by the rules of common sense and fair
dealing • • .
'

The plaintiffs did undertake to alleviate their dam 31

,I

as far as was reasonable, by laying a driveway across thei:I
lot to the one street the defendants had paved.

i

The tria'. I

court was correct in concluding that the plaintiffs had

M

duty to further mitigate damages by paving the road at the::
own expense.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES WAS THE PRESENT
COST OF COMPLETING THE CONTRACT.
The rule for measuring compensatory damages, as states
in 25 C.J.S. §74,

is:

The measure of damages for breach of contract is substantive law.
The measure
is the amount which will compensate the
injured person for the loss which a
fulfillment of the contract would have
prevented or the breach of it has entailed,
and, under this principle, the meac,ure of
damages in the case of breach of f' ci:ticular
contracts has been stated, including building and construction contracts. The same
is true with respect to the measure of
damages with regard to subcontracts.
I

Compensation is the value of the performance
1
of the contract; the person injured is, ajsI
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far as it is possible to do so by monetary
award, to be placed in the position he would
have been in had the contract been performed.
The plaintiffs cannot be placed "in the position he would
have been in had the contract been performed" unless ·the damage
award is sufficient to pave the road at current prices.
~e

Were

defendants able to escape by paying, with inflated dollars,

what the cost of completing the contract would have been
several years ago, then they will have profited from their
breach of the contract.

Such a rule of law would create a

dangerous incentive.
This Court has stated, with reference to damages in personal injury actions, that:
The present cost of living and the diminished purchasing power of the dollar
may be taken into consideration when
estimating damages.
(Citing cases omitted)
Duffy vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 118 Utah 82, 218
P.2d 1080, 1083 (1950).

The same rule should apply to contract cases.
The trial court correctly concluded that the sum of
$4,500.00 would be necessary to compensate the plaintiffs for
the defendants• breach of contract.

That finding should be

affirmed.
If, as defendants advocate, the damages are measured at

1974 prices with interest added, the resulting award would be
very close to that determined by the trial court.

There was

evidence that in early 1974 the cost of improving the road would
have been approximately $7.00 per lineal foot for the curb,
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gutter and sidewalk and an additional $7.00 per linealfc
for the asphalt, or a total of C!pproximat·'c'lj $14.00 per L
foot for all required improvem<:nts.

Fourteen dollars l\L.I

multiplied by the length of plaintiffs' lot, 199 feet, y:•'
a total of $2,786.00.

Interest on that amount at 6% for:
I

years would be $1, l 7 0 .12 for a total damage figure fort~· I
cost of improvements only of approximately $3,956.12. Th:)
does not include the cost to the plaintiffs of installing
extra driveway across their lot.
The damages even under the defendants'

theory would:.

be substantially different from those found by the trialc
therefore his judgment should be affirmed.
POINT V
THE SUMS AWARDED BY THE TRIAL COUR'r FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES WERE REASONABLE.
This Court has held, with respect to a trial court's
award of attorney's fees,

that:

In the absence of patent error or cl~ar
abuse of discretion, this court will
not disturb his findings and judgment.
(Citing 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs §78)
Beckstrom vs. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520,

524 (Utah, 1978),

Defendant argues t h a t par t o f th e attorney • s fees [r,:.
by the plaintiffs were the result of an error in draftinf
plaintiffs'

first complaint, and that it is not reasonable

include that part of the cost in the award for attorney's:
The trial court concluded that its award was reasona

ble '

·
f fercd
was obviously a compromise from the testimony o

bj

!

.
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It i '

bl€ t'

I

I

'''''~

assume that attor-neys will make some er-rors.

,,i

ec:ors is as much a part of a reasonable attorney's fee as is
the cost of the error-free services.
There was evidence presented at the trial that the attorney's
fees incurred by the plaintiffs totaled $962. 50 for services
in preparation for trial, and an additional approximately
$400. 00 for services at and subsequent to the trial.

e

Defendants'

evidence was that $750.00 was a reasonable attorney's fee.
%e award of $960.00 was clearly not an abuse of discretion
and represented a compromise by the court which obviously considered time spent by plaintiffs' counsel in redrafting the
complaint.
POINT VI
IF THE JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED, THE PLAINTIFFS
ARE ENTITLED TO A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE
FOR RESPONDING TO THIS APPEAL.

s

nr

The cost of those

In Management Service Corp. vs. Development Associates,
617 P. 2d 406, 409 (Utah, 1980), the plaintiff-buyer contracted
to buy lots in a subdivision from the defendant-seller, and
later brought an action to enforce the contract.

The trial

court gave judgment for the plaintiffs, and the defendants
appealed.

The plaintiffs prevailed on appeal and requested

additional attorney's fees for successfully defending the
appeal.
This Court, overruling two prior cases, stated that:
We therefore adopt the rule of law that
a provision for payment of attorney's
fees in a contract includes attorney's
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fees incurred by the prevailing party on
appeal as well as at trial, if the action
is brought to enforce the contract . . .
The earnest money receipt and offer to purchase int
case at bar provides that if a party breaches the contra:·
"he agrees to pay all expenses of enforcing this agree~;
or of any right arising out of the breach thereof, incL:
a reasonable attorney's fee."

{See Exhibit No. 2 - Ap~;·

"B" attached.)
If the plaintiffs are successful in responding to
dants' appeal, the defendants should be ordered to pay
plaintiffs the cost of this appeal,

t•:

including a reasona2_

attorney's fee.
CONCLUSION
The requirement in the earnest money receipt ana
to purchase agreement that defendants provide "special
paving" and other improvements was unambiguous, and paro:

I

I

evidence to vary the terms of that agreement was properl·

I
1

excluded.

I

The trial court was correct in concluding that

defendants were required to pave the side road by pla1nti'
lot.

The· judgment of the trial court, awarding damages!'

failure to pave the road, should be affirmed.
The plaintiffs should receive, in addition to the:1-·

ment awarded by the trial court, a reasonable attorney:
for responding to this appeal.
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l

submitted this

l?it- day of February, 1981.

CRAQ6:! SNt!:

f 1ct,__,,

HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for PlaintiffsRespondents

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) copies of the
foregoing Brief to Mr. Ronald R. Stanger, Attorney for
Defendants-Appellants, 38 North University, P.O. Box 477,
Provo, Utah 84601, postage prepaid, this Iltlt.Jday of
February, 1981.
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CH~~IG ~;. SNYDER, for:
HOWARD. LEWIS &: PETERSEN

1

A110RNE:YS ANO COUN91!.L.OR9 AT LAW
120 EA.5T 300 Nolll'TH STlttST
P. O. !lo:ii; 77B
PROVO. VTAH 84801

2

T'r:L..E~>tO>U.: 373.93·~

3
4
5

Attorneys for

7

Plain t1 ff s

IN T~~ FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTKICT COUHT Of UTAH COUNTY

6

STATIC OF UThH

I

ai

IJ\)HtJ M. ALEXANllEK and HELEN
9 ,<>.LEXANllC:R,
1

11

12

FINDINGS Of FACT ANU
CONCLUSIOl~S OF LA"

Pla1nt1ffs,

10
vs.

DELL BHO~N, GLEN f. bHOWN,
nAYNE L. dRO~N, and WAKREN U.
13 B~owN, partners, d/u/a BLW
COMPANY,
L~~

14

C1v1l No.

'17,426

LJetendants.

15
16

'I'rlIS IHdtter navu1g come on regularly for trial on the l9tn day

1?

of June, 1980, and tne plaintiffs having appeared in person a~

18

represented by tne i r counsel, Craig M. Snyder, and the defendants

·l 9 nav1ng appeared by and through Lee Dell tirown ano their counsel,

20 .t<.onald

.k.

21 r~ce1ved

Stanyer, and the Court having heard the testimony, havin~
tne evidence ctnd tne exhibits on file herein, havin';I neard,

22 the arguments of counsel for the respective parties, having previo:si
I

23 ly taken the matter under advisement and naving rendered its

iner..ora:,·
I

24 dur.i decision herein and being fully advised in the premises,

does

25 nereby maKe and enter the following:

26

FINlllNGS Of FACT

27

1.

Plaintiffs are residents of Utah County, state of utan.

28

2.

Defendants, Lee Dell Brown, Wayne L. Brown and warren

29

Brown, are partners doing business as HLW Company.

30
31

32

LJ,

J.

I in

At all times material hereto, BLW company was doing tiu.:;ine:;

Utah County, State of Utan.
4.

Defendants, Lee Dell Brown a11d Wayne L.

Hr own, are rt:siot
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s·

l

Utah County, State of Utah.

5.

2

uefendant Warren D. Brown is a resident of Salt Lake County,

State of Utah.

b.

on or about the 26tn day of Novemoer, 1973, defendants and

p1a1nt1f fs entered into an Earnest Money Receipt and Of fer to

Ptirchase concerning property located at 472 South 1920 west in Provo
Utah, and more particularly described as Lot 5, Plat •a", Ranchette

8 Lanes Suud1vision.
7.

In the Earnest Money Agreement, plaintiffs agreed to

10 purchase said property from the defendants and defendants agreed to
11 sell to the plaintiffs that property described in tne said Earnest

12 Money Agreement.
13

8.

Said

prop~rty

was to be sold in accordance with the terms

14 and prov1s1ons as set forth in the Earnest Money Agreement.

15

9.

The Court specifically finds no amuiguity in lines 29, 30

16 and 31 of Exh1b1 t

"2 11 which in fact is tne Earnest Money Agreement

17 dated November 26, 1973.

18

lU.

Defendants were required to provide to the plaintiffs a

19 lot which was fully iQproved including sidewalk, curb, gutter and
20
21
I

22
23
24

25
26
27

28
29

30

31

L"

street paving improvements on 1920 west Street and also sidewalk,

curn, gutter and street paving improvements on 460 Soutn Street.
11.

Demand has been made upon the defendants to complete tne

lh1provements in accordance with tne provisions of Exhioit "2" and

the defendants have failed, neglected and refused to make the said
improvements in accordance with Exhibit •2• and particularly those
improvements along 460 South Street including the sidewalk, cure,
gutter and street pavement.
12.

The Court finds that the plaintiffs nave been damaged oy

tne defendants' refusal to make the improvements along 460 South

Street including the sidewalk, curb, gutter and street paving and
tt1 at lhe cost of making tnose improvements would be $4,500.00 for
wn1~h

pla1nt1f fs snall be entitled to Judgment.
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10

I

I

l

l3.

'l'ne Court finds that the plaint1fts have not breacned

2

of tne1r ooliyat1ons under the l:arnest Money Ayreement dated

3

l-loven<ber 26,

4

Lnereunder including payment of the purchase price of the lot.

5
6

14.

1973,

15.

illl/

and they have comµleted all of the requir.;:ments
i !

i

Tne Court finds that tne pld1nt1rfs 1 second cause of

action for fraud

7

is without merit and should be d1sm1ssed.

The Court finds that the counterclaim filed w1tn the

8 defendants' amended answer to the amended complaint was flOt pemt:'r
9

oy

the Court at the pretrial conference and, therefore, should oe

j..0 d1sin1ssed.
11

lb.

~tne Court finds that the aff1rmat1ve defenses raised i~:

12 the defendants' amended answer to tne amended complC11nt are witr:o~·

1

13 merit dnd inappl1caole in tne present case.

14

17.

I

Tne Court finds tnat the pla1nt1tfs have retained Craig M.

15 Snyuer, Attorney at Law, Provo, Utan, for tne purposes of

pursuing

1

I

16 tnis action and nave agreed to pay him a reasonaole fee for his
17 services.

The Court finds that

~960.00

is a reasonaole fee

for toe/

18 services of the piaintiffs' attorney herein and that pursuant to
19 the provisions of the Earnest Money Agreement, the pla1nt1ffs are
20 entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee herein.

21

From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes an,J

22 enters the following:

23
24
25

CONCLUSIONS Of LAW
l.

Plaintiffs are entitled to judgraent against the defendanto

J01ntly and severally in the araount of $4,500.00, together witn

26 attorney's fees in the amount of $Y60. 00 and court costs in tne
27

28

amount of $27.50.

2.

Said judgment sna.11 collect interest at the rate of elyn:

29

percent { l::Pt) per annum from the date of Judyment herein until paJJ

30

in full.

31

32

3.

I

Defendants are entitled to judy1tlent, no cause of action,

on the second cause of action on tne pla1ntifts'

amended complJir.'
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I

4.

I,anJ

Pla1nt1ffs are entitled to judgment, no cause of action,

to an order of dismissal of the defendants' counterclaim

I

J \t1ere1n.

DAT~D

II

this

3

day of Septem!.ler, 1980.

45

BY THE COURT:

~~~~

:I
~~ILED

a copy of the foregoing to Mr. Rondld R. Stanger,

Attorney for Defendants, 38 North University, Provo, Utah, 84601,

lO

tc1lS

,.,r-J.

~day

of Septe@ber,

11
12

13

z'

~~

14

"
,,~l '' 151

.

~· ~

i

~ 0

i~

~

16

'° ;

17 I

~:

18

J~ L

(!

~~
1;

19

20
21
22

23

24
25

26
27
28

29
30
'l

LJ
?
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105

7
CMIG M.

I

for:

SN'iULK,

HOWARD. LEWIS 8c PETERSEN

l

ATTOi'tNi;:.YS ANO COUNSEL.ORS AT LAW
IZO E.>.sT 300 N0"1"'f STitlST
,., o. Boll: 776
PAOVO. UTAH 94901

2

I

I
I

nu:-oHI:: 373-9345-

I

3

I

4

I

5

Attomep, for

Plaintiffs

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CUUR~ OF UTAH CuUNTY

6

STATE UF UTAH

7

8
9

JOHN M. ALEXANDER and HJ::LEN
ALJ::XANDER,

11
12
13

vs.
Civil No.

LEE DELL BROwN, GLt:N F. BHOvlN,
vlAYNC:- L. Bl{(MN' and l\ARRC:N u.
BR<JwN, partners, d/o/a BLvl
CUMPAiiY,

14
15
16

JUUG<~ENT

Plaintiffs,

10

47,42b

Defendants.

1'HIS matter having come on regularly for trial on June 19,

17

1980, and

18

represented by their attorney,

·19

having appeared by and

through Lee Dell Brown and their attorney,
the Court having heard tne testimony,

the plaintiffs having appeared in person and being

Stanger,

and

Craig M. Snyder, and the defendants

20

Ronald R.

.21

received the evidence and tt1e exnibits on file nerein, having

22

previously taken tne matter under advisement and rendered its

23

memorandum decision herein, and being fully advised in the prem e 1

24

and having previously entered its Findings of Fact and conclusions:

25

of Law herein, now upon application of counsel,

15 5

m;CRE~D:

26

IT IS HERt:BY ORDERED,

.27

Plaintiffs are awarded Judgment against the defendants, Lee

ADJUDGED AND

.28

uell Brown, Wayne L. Brown and warren D.

29

JOintly and severally

30. attorney's fees
31

srown, d/o/a BLW comtiany,

in tne amount of $4,

sou. 00

together with

in the amount of $960.00 and court costs in

amount of $27.50.

Interest shall accrue on the totdl amount

said Judgment at the rate of eight percent

(8%)

ue
01

w

JJer annum from tne'

32
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10ti

1 date of tne JUdgment herein until such time as it is paid in full.
2

DATED this

-3

day of Septemoer, 1980.
BY THE COURT:

~£~

4

ALLEN B. SORENSEN, District Judge

MAILED a copy of the foregoing to Mr. Ronald R. Stanger,

Attorney at Law, 38 North University, Provo, Utah, 84601,
8

~o

11

day of Septemoer, 1980.

this~

,{c~~

12
13
zl

•l
~~ ~

14

tn

15

11h~

!5'°~ g

16

~~ ~ 0

.

17

l9;o

,~~:.:
It~ c

18

l'

19

(Z ~

~~

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
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